Excerpts with Notes
Early Works of Karl Marx: Book of Verse
Man and Drum
A Fable
A Drum it is no Man, and a Man he is no Drum,The Drum is very clever, and the Man is very dumb.
The Drum is tied with straps, but the Man is on his own,And the Drum sits firm when the Man falls down[HAC1] .
The angry Man he beats it, and the Drum goes bippety-bop,Yes, the merry Drum it rattles, and the Man goes hippety-hop.
And then the Man pulls faces, and the Drum it laughs at him,And the Man shouts up and down the house and makes an awful din.
"Hey, Drum, he, Drum, why laugh so mockingly?You take me for a fool and you stick out your tongue at me!
"Damn you, Drum, you shame me, you jeer and you deride!Why d'you rattle when I beat, why d'you hang where you were tied?
"You think I raised you from a tree into a Drum full-grown[HAC2] To carry on like that as if you'd done it on your own?
"You shall dance when I beat, you shall beat when I sing,You shall cry when I laugh, you shall laugh when I spring."
The Man scowls at the Drum all in a sudden furious bout[HAC3] ,He bangs and bangs and bangs it till its blood comes gushing out
So the Drum it has no Man, and the Man he has no Drum,And the Man takes holy orders for a friar to become[HAC4]
From Karl Marx’s Capital, v. 1 SECTION 4
THE FETISHISM OF COMMODITIES AND THE SECRET THEREOF
A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties. So far as it is a value in use, there is nothing mysterious about it, whether we consider it from the point of view that by its properties it is capable of satisfying human wants[HAC5] , or from the point that those properties are the product of human labor[HAC6] . It is as clear as noon-day, that man, by his industry, changes the forms of the materials furnished by Nature, in such a way as to make them useful to him. The form of wood, for instance, is altered, by making a table out of it. Yet, for all that, the table continues to be that common, every-day thing, wood. But, as soon as it steps forth as a commodity, it is changed into something transcendent. It not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than “table-turning” ever was.
The mystical character of commodities does not originate, therefore, in their use value. Just as little does it proceed from the nature of the determining factors of value. For, in the first place, however varied the useful kinds of labor, or productive activities, may be, it is a physiological fact, that they are functions of the human organism, and that each such function, whatever may be its nature or form, is essentially the expenditure of human brain, nerves, muscles, &c. Secondly, with regard to that which forms the ground-work for the quantitative determination of value, namely, the duration of that expenditure, or the quantity of labor, it is quite clear that there is a palpable difference between its quantity and quality. In all states of society, the labor time that it costs to produce the means of subsistence, must necessarily be an object of interest to mankind, though not of equal interest in different stages of development. And lastly, from the moment that men in any way work for one another, their labor assumes a social[HAC7] form[HAC8] .
Whence, then, arises the enigmatical character of the product of labor, as soon as it assumes the form of commodities? Clearly from this form itself. The equality of all sorts of human labor is expressed objectively by their products all being equally values; the measure of the expenditure of labor power by the duration of that expenditure, takes the form of the quantity of value of the products of labor; and finally the mutual relations of the producers, within which the social character of their labor affirms itself, take the form of a social relation between the products.
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men’s labor appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labor; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labor is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labor. This is the reason why the products of labor become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses. In the same way the light from an object is perceived by us not as the subjective excitation of our optic nerve, but as the objective form of something outside the eye itself. But, in the act of seeing, there is at all events, an actual passage of light from one thing to another, from the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation between physical things. But it is different with commodities. There, the existence of the things quâ commodities, and the value relation between the products of labor which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connection with their physical[HAC9] properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men’s hands. This I call the Fetishism[HAC10] which attaches itself to the products of labor, as soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities.
This Fetishism of commodities has its origin, as the foregoing analysis has already shown, in the peculiar social character of the labor that produces them.
As a general rule, articles of utility become commodities, only because they are products of the labor of private individuals or groups of individuals who carry on their work independently of each other. The sum total of the labor of all these private individuals forms the aggregate labor of society. Since the producers do not come into social contact with each other until they exchange their products, the specific social character of each producer’s labor does not show itself except in the act of exchange[HAC11] . In other words, the labor of the individual asserts itself as a part of the labor of society, only by means of the relations which the act of exchange establishes directly between the products, and indirectly, through them, between the producers. To the latter, therefore, the relations connecting the labor of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons and social relations between things. It is only by being exchanged that the products of labor acquire, as values, one uniform social status, distinct from their varied forms of existence as objects of utility. This division of a product into a useful thing and a value becomes practically important, only when exchange has acquired such an extension that useful articles are produced for the purpose of being exchanged, and their character as values has therefore to be taken into account, beforehand, during production. From this moment the labor of the individual producer acquires socially a twofold character. On the one hand, it must, as a definite useful kind of labor, satisfy a definite social want, and thus hold its place as part and parcel of the collective labor of all, as a branch of a social division of labor that has sprung up spontaneously. On the other hand, it can satisfy the manifold wants of the individual producer himself, only in so far as the mutual exchangeability of all kinds of useful private labor is an established social fact, and therefore the private useful labor of each producer ranks on an equality with that of all others. The equalization of the most different kinds of labor can be the result only of an abstraction from their inequalities, or of reducing them to their common denominator, viz. expenditure of human labor power or human labor in the abstract. The twofold social character of the labor of the individual appears to him, when reflected in his brain, only under those forms which are impressed upon that labor in every-day practice by the exchange of products. In this way, the character that his own labor possesses of being socially useful takes the form of the condition, that the product must be not only useful, but useful for others, and the social character that his particular labor has of being the equal of all other particular kinds of labor, takes the form that all the physically different articles that are the products of labor. have one common quality, viz., that of having value.
Hence, when we bring the products of our labor into relation with each other as values, it is not because we see in these articles the material receptacles of homogeneous human labor[HAC12] . Quite the contrary: whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act, we also equate, as human labor, the different kinds of labor expended upon them. We are not aware of this, nevertheless we do it.[28] Value, therefore, does not stalk about with a label describing what it is. It is value, rather, that converts every product into a social hieroglyphic. Later on, we try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of our own social products; for to stamp an object of utility as a value, is just as much a social product as language.
Rousseau: Social Contract
Chp. 9: Real Property
EACH member of the community gives himself to it, at the moment of its foundation, just as he is, with all the resources at his command, including the goods he possesses[HAC13] . This act does not make possession, in changing hands, change its nature, and become property in the hands of the Sovereign; but, as the forces of the city are incomparably greater than those of an individual, public possession is also, in fact, stronger and more irrevocable, without being any more legitimate, at any rate from the point of view of foreigners. For the State, in relation to its members, is master of all their goods by the social contract, which, within the State, is the basis of all rights; but, in relation to other powers, it is so only by the right of the first occupier[HAC14] , which it holds from its members.
The right of the first occupier, though more real than the right of the strongest, becomes a real right only when the right of property has already been established. Every man has naturally a right to everything he needs; but the positive act which makes him proprietor of one thing excludes him from everything else. Having his share, he ought to keep to it, and can have no further right against the community. This is why the right of the first occupier, which in the state of nature is so weak, claims the respect of every man in civil society. In this right we are respecting not so much what belongs to another as what does not belong to ourselves.
In general, to establish the right of the first occupier over a plot of ground, the following conditions are necessary: first, the land must not yet be inhabited; secondly, a man must occupy only the amount he needs for his subsistence; and, in the third place, possession must be taken, not by an empty ceremony, but by labor and cultivation, the only sign of proprietorship that should be respected by others, in default of a legal title[HAC15] .
In granting the right of first occupancy to necessity and labor, are we not really stretching it as far as it can go? Is it possible to leave such a right unlimited? Is it to be enough to set foot on a plot of common ground, in order to be able to call yourself at once the master of it? Is it to be enough that a man has the strength to expel others for a moment, in order to establish his right to prevent them from ever returning? How can a man or a people seize an immense territory and keep it from the rest of the world except by a punishable usurpation, since all others are being robbed, by such an act, of the place of habitation and the means of subsistence which nature gave them in common? When Nunez Balboa, standing on the sea-shore, took possession of the South Seas and the whole of South America in the name of the crown of Castile, was that enough to dispossess all their actual inhabitants, and to shut out from them all the princes of the world? On such a showing, these ceremonies are idly multiplied, and the Catholic King need only take possession all at once, from his apartment, of the whole universe[HAC16] , merely making a subsequent reservation about what was already in the possession of other princes.
We can imagine how the lands of individuals, where they were contiguous and came to be united, became the public territory, and how the right of Sovereignty, extending from the subjects over the lands they held, became at once real and personal. The possessors were thus made more dependent, and the forces at their command used to guarantee their fidelity. The advantage of this does not seem to have been felt by ancient monarchs, who called themselves Kings of the Persians, Scythians, or Macedonians, and seemed to regard themselves more as rulers of men than as masters of a country. Those of the present day more cleverly call themselves Kings of France, Spain, England, etc.: thus holding the land, they are quite confident of holding the inhabitants[HAC17] .
The peculiar fact about this alienation is that, in taking over the goods of individuals, the community, so far from despoiling them, only assures them legitimate possession, and changes usurpation into a true right and enjoyment into proprietorship. Thus the possessors, being regarded as depositaries of the public good, and having their rights respected by all the members of the State and maintained against foreign aggression by all its forces, have, by a cession which benefits both the public and still more themselves, acquired, so to speak, all that they gave up. This paradox may easily be explained by the distinction between the rights which the Sovereign and the proprietor have over the same estate, as we shall see later on.
It may also happen that men begin to unite one with another before they possess anything, and that, subsequently occupying a tract of country which is enough for all, they enjoy it in common, or share it out among themselves, either equally or according to a scale fixed by the Sovereign. However the acquisition be made, the right which each individual has to his own estate is always subordinate to the right which the community has over all: without this, there would be neither stability in the social tie, nor real force in the exercise of Sovereignty[HAC18] .
John Locke Second Treatise
Sec. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself[HAC19] . The labor of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.[HAC20] Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property[HAC21] . It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labor something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labor being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.
Sec. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. No body can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labor put a distinction between them and common: that added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right. And will any one say, he had no right to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in, which begins the property; without which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that part, does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, become my property, without the assignation or consent of any body. The labor that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.
Sec. 29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to any one's appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common, children or servants could not cut the meat, which their father or master had provided for them in common, without assigning to every one his peculiar part. Though the water running in the fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labor hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself.
Sec. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who hath killed it; it is allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed his labor upon it, though before it was the common right of every one. And amongst those who are counted the civilized part of mankind, who have made and multiplied positive laws to determine property, this original law of nature, for the beginning of property, in what was before common, still takes place; and by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind; or what ambergris any one takes up here, is by the labor that removes it out of that common state nature left it in, made his property[HAC22] , who takes that pains about it. And even amongst us, the hare that any one is hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the chase: for being a beast that is still looked upon as common, and no man's private possession; whoever has employed so much labor about any of that kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a property.
Adam Smith Wealth of Nations Book I, ch. 5
The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys[HAC23] . The one may be called 'value in use ;' the other, 'value in exchange.' The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange[HAC24] ; and on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water: but it will purchase scarce any thing; scarce any thing can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it.
Every man is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of human life.*1 But after the division of labor has once thoroughly taken place, it is but a very small part of these with which a man's own labor can supply him. The far greater part of them he must derive from the labor of other people, and he must be rich or poor according to the quantity of that labor which he can command, or which he can afford to purchase[HAC25] . The value of any commodity, therefore, to the person who possesses it, and who means not to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for other commodities, is equal to the quantity of labor which it enables him to purchase or command. Labor, therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities.
The[HAC26] real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is really worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which it can impose upon other people. What is bought with money or with goods is purchased by labor,*2 as much as what we acquire by the toil of our own body. That money or those goods indeed save us this toil. They contain the value of a certain quantity of labor which we exchange for what is supposed at the time to contain the value of an equal quantity. Labor was the first price, the original purchase-money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labor, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased; and its value, to those who possess it, and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labor which it can enable them to purchase or command.
Notes
[HAC1]If we make Man = owner and Drum = Laborer, what does this mean? An entrepreneur has no help because he is a competitor, and if his business fails he has nothing. A laborer is “tied with straps” – a slave in a sense, dependent on wages – but he sits firm because his labor will be needed by other companies if this one fails.
[HAC2]The Employer defines his laborer’s identity (commodity fetishism)
[HAC3]Does an Employer own his employee, or does he depend on his employee? Can a man enjoy music with no drum to play on? The idea here is equality – or lack thereof
[HAC4]A friar is a laborer – someone who does the work of God. The question here: is it impossible to beat commodity fetishism, or will we always define our value in terms of social worth?
[HAC5]One value is USE VALUE, and it is subjective – each person determines for himself what an object is worth based on what practical use it gives.
[HAC6]The Marxist approach: LABOR THEORY: value is based on the labor put into an object to make that object useful for himself and others.
[HAC7]How is labor “Social”? Because we are “selling ourselves” to our employers – we ourselves are commodities, sold in exchange for wages. One problem here then is the subjective value of wages: Ideally, 9 hours of work by a garbage man should be equivalent to 9 hours of work by a lawyer. But socially our labor is not based on equality of time put into our job.
[HAC8]What does Marx mean here? First, the amount of time we work is important because it determines our wages, which determine our ability to buy food (food->necessariesàwages).
[HAC9]A commodity made out of labor contains part of the person who put his labor into the object, and that is what adds to its value. Think here of a home made birthday card versus one that you buy in a store – which one holds more value? The home made one, because it has sentimental value, due to the giver’s personality becoming part of the card itself.
[HAC10]Fetish is an obsessive attachment to an object, to the extent that the object (commodity) holds power over a person, and somewhat defines their personality and existence. Marx says all of society exists on COMMODITY FETISHISM: We are brought together only because of our desire to make money, and to exchange objects – material things are what defines our social interaction. producers and consumers have no direct human contact that involve providing for each other with no benefit to themselves. . Production and consumption are private experiences of person to commodity and material self-interest, not person to person and communal interest.
[HAC11]A Bit tricky but here is the basic idea: When it comes to society we are defined in terms of what we can contribute to our society, which is LABOR. Hence, for society we are defined and judged in terms of the things we produce. The worth of our labor (and hence, of us as individuals) is not apparent until an exchange of what we have produced takes place. No trade = our effort is irrelevant = we as individuals are irrelevant.
[HAC12]If we saw it as “homogenous human labor” then 9 hours of work removing garbage would be equal to 9 hours of work in a court of law.
[HAC13]This is what it means to be a citizen – being part of a community means you have responsibilities in that community.
[HAC14]Being a citizen, your property and all that you are belong to the government “technically.” However, the true owner of the property, who has the most right to it, is one who meets these conditions: 1. He owns it if he needs it, but owning that one thing also demands that he not own anything else = no greed
[HAC15]Other conditions: As stated above 1. He can only claim as property that which he needs to survive, 2. the property cannot have others living on it already, 3. You cannot declare property yours and then do nothing with it – you have to work with it, a “title of ownership” is not enough. REMEMBER: Rousseau is one of the forefathers of Democracy, which meant something quite different from the Monarchy in which the nobility declared ownership over things without meeting these conditions.
[HAC16]Notice his criticism here about the “Catholic King” – such a king would claim ownership over the universe, because back then people believed in Divine Right – that the king was crowned by God’s determination (hence, by the Pope)
[HAC17]Previous kings ruled over men, not over land
[HAC18]The “because has an equal right to ownership, nobody has a right to own anything” theory – if everything is communally shared, there will be no social bickering, and people will live in communal bliss.
[HAC19]People may claim rights over the earth and its creatures, but each man has ownership over his own body/identity.
[HAC20]A man’s identity is defined by his labor (similar to Marx)
[HAC21]Therefore, when a man puts himself (through his labor) into an object, that thing becomes his (and part of his identity) = commodity fetishism, the “magical” object
[HAC22]Remember, the concept here is that nobody can “own” something unless he has labored for it. This implies I can catch a deer in any forest UNLESS that forest has been claimed as property by someone who is actually putting labor into the forest.
[HAC23]2 kinds of value: 1. Usefulness and 2. Exchange Value – what you can get if you trade it
[HAC24]Note the paradox here – for centuries Economists tried to explain what is known as the Diamond-Water paradox. Why does something useful and necessary like water have little value compared to something rare and generally “useless” like a diamond? You can find explanations that relate to the other theories we discussed tonight at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diamond_water_paradox
[HAC25]Like Marx = labor defines value, and we must depend on others to determine how much wealth and value we have
[HAC26]The opportunity cost – value based on what a person will give up for an item, and how much benefit owning the item will afford
Man and Drum
A Fable
A Drum it is no Man, and a Man he is no Drum,The Drum is very clever, and the Man is very dumb.
The Drum is tied with straps, but the Man is on his own,And the Drum sits firm when the Man falls down[HAC1] .
The angry Man he beats it, and the Drum goes bippety-bop,Yes, the merry Drum it rattles, and the Man goes hippety-hop.
And then the Man pulls faces, and the Drum it laughs at him,And the Man shouts up and down the house and makes an awful din.
"Hey, Drum, he, Drum, why laugh so mockingly?You take me for a fool and you stick out your tongue at me!
"Damn you, Drum, you shame me, you jeer and you deride!Why d'you rattle when I beat, why d'you hang where you were tied?
"You think I raised you from a tree into a Drum full-grown[HAC2] To carry on like that as if you'd done it on your own?
"You shall dance when I beat, you shall beat when I sing,You shall cry when I laugh, you shall laugh when I spring."
The Man scowls at the Drum all in a sudden furious bout[HAC3] ,He bangs and bangs and bangs it till its blood comes gushing out
So the Drum it has no Man, and the Man he has no Drum,And the Man takes holy orders for a friar to become[HAC4]
From Karl Marx’s Capital, v. 1 SECTION 4
THE FETISHISM OF COMMODITIES AND THE SECRET THEREOF
A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties. So far as it is a value in use, there is nothing mysterious about it, whether we consider it from the point of view that by its properties it is capable of satisfying human wants[HAC5] , or from the point that those properties are the product of human labor[HAC6] . It is as clear as noon-day, that man, by his industry, changes the forms of the materials furnished by Nature, in such a way as to make them useful to him. The form of wood, for instance, is altered, by making a table out of it. Yet, for all that, the table continues to be that common, every-day thing, wood. But, as soon as it steps forth as a commodity, it is changed into something transcendent. It not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than “table-turning” ever was.
The mystical character of commodities does not originate, therefore, in their use value. Just as little does it proceed from the nature of the determining factors of value. For, in the first place, however varied the useful kinds of labor, or productive activities, may be, it is a physiological fact, that they are functions of the human organism, and that each such function, whatever may be its nature or form, is essentially the expenditure of human brain, nerves, muscles, &c. Secondly, with regard to that which forms the ground-work for the quantitative determination of value, namely, the duration of that expenditure, or the quantity of labor, it is quite clear that there is a palpable difference between its quantity and quality. In all states of society, the labor time that it costs to produce the means of subsistence, must necessarily be an object of interest to mankind, though not of equal interest in different stages of development. And lastly, from the moment that men in any way work for one another, their labor assumes a social[HAC7] form[HAC8] .
Whence, then, arises the enigmatical character of the product of labor, as soon as it assumes the form of commodities? Clearly from this form itself. The equality of all sorts of human labor is expressed objectively by their products all being equally values; the measure of the expenditure of labor power by the duration of that expenditure, takes the form of the quantity of value of the products of labor; and finally the mutual relations of the producers, within which the social character of their labor affirms itself, take the form of a social relation between the products.
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men’s labor appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labor; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labor is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labor. This is the reason why the products of labor become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses. In the same way the light from an object is perceived by us not as the subjective excitation of our optic nerve, but as the objective form of something outside the eye itself. But, in the act of seeing, there is at all events, an actual passage of light from one thing to another, from the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation between physical things. But it is different with commodities. There, the existence of the things quâ commodities, and the value relation between the products of labor which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connection with their physical[HAC9] properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men’s hands. This I call the Fetishism[HAC10] which attaches itself to the products of labor, as soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities.
This Fetishism of commodities has its origin, as the foregoing analysis has already shown, in the peculiar social character of the labor that produces them.
As a general rule, articles of utility become commodities, only because they are products of the labor of private individuals or groups of individuals who carry on their work independently of each other. The sum total of the labor of all these private individuals forms the aggregate labor of society. Since the producers do not come into social contact with each other until they exchange their products, the specific social character of each producer’s labor does not show itself except in the act of exchange[HAC11] . In other words, the labor of the individual asserts itself as a part of the labor of society, only by means of the relations which the act of exchange establishes directly between the products, and indirectly, through them, between the producers. To the latter, therefore, the relations connecting the labor of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons and social relations between things. It is only by being exchanged that the products of labor acquire, as values, one uniform social status, distinct from their varied forms of existence as objects of utility. This division of a product into a useful thing and a value becomes practically important, only when exchange has acquired such an extension that useful articles are produced for the purpose of being exchanged, and their character as values has therefore to be taken into account, beforehand, during production. From this moment the labor of the individual producer acquires socially a twofold character. On the one hand, it must, as a definite useful kind of labor, satisfy a definite social want, and thus hold its place as part and parcel of the collective labor of all, as a branch of a social division of labor that has sprung up spontaneously. On the other hand, it can satisfy the manifold wants of the individual producer himself, only in so far as the mutual exchangeability of all kinds of useful private labor is an established social fact, and therefore the private useful labor of each producer ranks on an equality with that of all others. The equalization of the most different kinds of labor can be the result only of an abstraction from their inequalities, or of reducing them to their common denominator, viz. expenditure of human labor power or human labor in the abstract. The twofold social character of the labor of the individual appears to him, when reflected in his brain, only under those forms which are impressed upon that labor in every-day practice by the exchange of products. In this way, the character that his own labor possesses of being socially useful takes the form of the condition, that the product must be not only useful, but useful for others, and the social character that his particular labor has of being the equal of all other particular kinds of labor, takes the form that all the physically different articles that are the products of labor. have one common quality, viz., that of having value.
Hence, when we bring the products of our labor into relation with each other as values, it is not because we see in these articles the material receptacles of homogeneous human labor[HAC12] . Quite the contrary: whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act, we also equate, as human labor, the different kinds of labor expended upon them. We are not aware of this, nevertheless we do it.[28] Value, therefore, does not stalk about with a label describing what it is. It is value, rather, that converts every product into a social hieroglyphic. Later on, we try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of our own social products; for to stamp an object of utility as a value, is just as much a social product as language.
Rousseau: Social Contract
Chp. 9: Real Property
EACH member of the community gives himself to it, at the moment of its foundation, just as he is, with all the resources at his command, including the goods he possesses[HAC13] . This act does not make possession, in changing hands, change its nature, and become property in the hands of the Sovereign; but, as the forces of the city are incomparably greater than those of an individual, public possession is also, in fact, stronger and more irrevocable, without being any more legitimate, at any rate from the point of view of foreigners. For the State, in relation to its members, is master of all their goods by the social contract, which, within the State, is the basis of all rights; but, in relation to other powers, it is so only by the right of the first occupier[HAC14] , which it holds from its members.
The right of the first occupier, though more real than the right of the strongest, becomes a real right only when the right of property has already been established. Every man has naturally a right to everything he needs; but the positive act which makes him proprietor of one thing excludes him from everything else. Having his share, he ought to keep to it, and can have no further right against the community. This is why the right of the first occupier, which in the state of nature is so weak, claims the respect of every man in civil society. In this right we are respecting not so much what belongs to another as what does not belong to ourselves.
In general, to establish the right of the first occupier over a plot of ground, the following conditions are necessary: first, the land must not yet be inhabited; secondly, a man must occupy only the amount he needs for his subsistence; and, in the third place, possession must be taken, not by an empty ceremony, but by labor and cultivation, the only sign of proprietorship that should be respected by others, in default of a legal title[HAC15] .
In granting the right of first occupancy to necessity and labor, are we not really stretching it as far as it can go? Is it possible to leave such a right unlimited? Is it to be enough to set foot on a plot of common ground, in order to be able to call yourself at once the master of it? Is it to be enough that a man has the strength to expel others for a moment, in order to establish his right to prevent them from ever returning? How can a man or a people seize an immense territory and keep it from the rest of the world except by a punishable usurpation, since all others are being robbed, by such an act, of the place of habitation and the means of subsistence which nature gave them in common? When Nunez Balboa, standing on the sea-shore, took possession of the South Seas and the whole of South America in the name of the crown of Castile, was that enough to dispossess all their actual inhabitants, and to shut out from them all the princes of the world? On such a showing, these ceremonies are idly multiplied, and the Catholic King need only take possession all at once, from his apartment, of the whole universe[HAC16] , merely making a subsequent reservation about what was already in the possession of other princes.
We can imagine how the lands of individuals, where they were contiguous and came to be united, became the public territory, and how the right of Sovereignty, extending from the subjects over the lands they held, became at once real and personal. The possessors were thus made more dependent, and the forces at their command used to guarantee their fidelity. The advantage of this does not seem to have been felt by ancient monarchs, who called themselves Kings of the Persians, Scythians, or Macedonians, and seemed to regard themselves more as rulers of men than as masters of a country. Those of the present day more cleverly call themselves Kings of France, Spain, England, etc.: thus holding the land, they are quite confident of holding the inhabitants[HAC17] .
The peculiar fact about this alienation is that, in taking over the goods of individuals, the community, so far from despoiling them, only assures them legitimate possession, and changes usurpation into a true right and enjoyment into proprietorship. Thus the possessors, being regarded as depositaries of the public good, and having their rights respected by all the members of the State and maintained against foreign aggression by all its forces, have, by a cession which benefits both the public and still more themselves, acquired, so to speak, all that they gave up. This paradox may easily be explained by the distinction between the rights which the Sovereign and the proprietor have over the same estate, as we shall see later on.
It may also happen that men begin to unite one with another before they possess anything, and that, subsequently occupying a tract of country which is enough for all, they enjoy it in common, or share it out among themselves, either equally or according to a scale fixed by the Sovereign. However the acquisition be made, the right which each individual has to his own estate is always subordinate to the right which the community has over all: without this, there would be neither stability in the social tie, nor real force in the exercise of Sovereignty[HAC18] .
John Locke Second Treatise
Sec. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself[HAC19] . The labor of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.[HAC20] Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property[HAC21] . It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labor something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labor being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.
Sec. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. No body can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labor put a distinction between them and common: that added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right. And will any one say, he had no right to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in, which begins the property; without which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that part, does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, become my property, without the assignation or consent of any body. The labor that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.
Sec. 29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to any one's appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common, children or servants could not cut the meat, which their father or master had provided for them in common, without assigning to every one his peculiar part. Though the water running in the fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labor hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself.
Sec. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who hath killed it; it is allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed his labor upon it, though before it was the common right of every one. And amongst those who are counted the civilized part of mankind, who have made and multiplied positive laws to determine property, this original law of nature, for the beginning of property, in what was before common, still takes place; and by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind; or what ambergris any one takes up here, is by the labor that removes it out of that common state nature left it in, made his property[HAC22] , who takes that pains about it. And even amongst us, the hare that any one is hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the chase: for being a beast that is still looked upon as common, and no man's private possession; whoever has employed so much labor about any of that kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a property.
Adam Smith Wealth of Nations Book I, ch. 5
The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys[HAC23] . The one may be called 'value in use ;' the other, 'value in exchange.' The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange[HAC24] ; and on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water: but it will purchase scarce any thing; scarce any thing can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it.
Every man is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of human life.*1 But after the division of labor has once thoroughly taken place, it is but a very small part of these with which a man's own labor can supply him. The far greater part of them he must derive from the labor of other people, and he must be rich or poor according to the quantity of that labor which he can command, or which he can afford to purchase[HAC25] . The value of any commodity, therefore, to the person who possesses it, and who means not to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for other commodities, is equal to the quantity of labor which it enables him to purchase or command. Labor, therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities.
The[HAC26] real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is really worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which it can impose upon other people. What is bought with money or with goods is purchased by labor,*2 as much as what we acquire by the toil of our own body. That money or those goods indeed save us this toil. They contain the value of a certain quantity of labor which we exchange for what is supposed at the time to contain the value of an equal quantity. Labor was the first price, the original purchase-money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labor, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased; and its value, to those who possess it, and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labor which it can enable them to purchase or command.
Notes
[HAC1]If we make Man = owner and Drum = Laborer, what does this mean? An entrepreneur has no help because he is a competitor, and if his business fails he has nothing. A laborer is “tied with straps” – a slave in a sense, dependent on wages – but he sits firm because his labor will be needed by other companies if this one fails.
[HAC2]The Employer defines his laborer’s identity (commodity fetishism)
[HAC3]Does an Employer own his employee, or does he depend on his employee? Can a man enjoy music with no drum to play on? The idea here is equality – or lack thereof
[HAC4]A friar is a laborer – someone who does the work of God. The question here: is it impossible to beat commodity fetishism, or will we always define our value in terms of social worth?
[HAC5]One value is USE VALUE, and it is subjective – each person determines for himself what an object is worth based on what practical use it gives.
[HAC6]The Marxist approach: LABOR THEORY: value is based on the labor put into an object to make that object useful for himself and others.
[HAC7]How is labor “Social”? Because we are “selling ourselves” to our employers – we ourselves are commodities, sold in exchange for wages. One problem here then is the subjective value of wages: Ideally, 9 hours of work by a garbage man should be equivalent to 9 hours of work by a lawyer. But socially our labor is not based on equality of time put into our job.
[HAC8]What does Marx mean here? First, the amount of time we work is important because it determines our wages, which determine our ability to buy food (food->necessariesàwages).
[HAC9]A commodity made out of labor contains part of the person who put his labor into the object, and that is what adds to its value. Think here of a home made birthday card versus one that you buy in a store – which one holds more value? The home made one, because it has sentimental value, due to the giver’s personality becoming part of the card itself.
[HAC10]Fetish is an obsessive attachment to an object, to the extent that the object (commodity) holds power over a person, and somewhat defines their personality and existence. Marx says all of society exists on COMMODITY FETISHISM: We are brought together only because of our desire to make money, and to exchange objects – material things are what defines our social interaction. producers and consumers have no direct human contact that involve providing for each other with no benefit to themselves. . Production and consumption are private experiences of person to commodity and material self-interest, not person to person and communal interest.
[HAC11]A Bit tricky but here is the basic idea: When it comes to society we are defined in terms of what we can contribute to our society, which is LABOR. Hence, for society we are defined and judged in terms of the things we produce. The worth of our labor (and hence, of us as individuals) is not apparent until an exchange of what we have produced takes place. No trade = our effort is irrelevant = we as individuals are irrelevant.
[HAC12]If we saw it as “homogenous human labor” then 9 hours of work removing garbage would be equal to 9 hours of work in a court of law.
[HAC13]This is what it means to be a citizen – being part of a community means you have responsibilities in that community.
[HAC14]Being a citizen, your property and all that you are belong to the government “technically.” However, the true owner of the property, who has the most right to it, is one who meets these conditions: 1. He owns it if he needs it, but owning that one thing also demands that he not own anything else = no greed
[HAC15]Other conditions: As stated above 1. He can only claim as property that which he needs to survive, 2. the property cannot have others living on it already, 3. You cannot declare property yours and then do nothing with it – you have to work with it, a “title of ownership” is not enough. REMEMBER: Rousseau is one of the forefathers of Democracy, which meant something quite different from the Monarchy in which the nobility declared ownership over things without meeting these conditions.
[HAC16]Notice his criticism here about the “Catholic King” – such a king would claim ownership over the universe, because back then people believed in Divine Right – that the king was crowned by God’s determination (hence, by the Pope)
[HAC17]Previous kings ruled over men, not over land
[HAC18]The “because has an equal right to ownership, nobody has a right to own anything” theory – if everything is communally shared, there will be no social bickering, and people will live in communal bliss.
[HAC19]People may claim rights over the earth and its creatures, but each man has ownership over his own body/identity.
[HAC20]A man’s identity is defined by his labor (similar to Marx)
[HAC21]Therefore, when a man puts himself (through his labor) into an object, that thing becomes his (and part of his identity) = commodity fetishism, the “magical” object
[HAC22]Remember, the concept here is that nobody can “own” something unless he has labored for it. This implies I can catch a deer in any forest UNLESS that forest has been claimed as property by someone who is actually putting labor into the forest.
[HAC23]2 kinds of value: 1. Usefulness and 2. Exchange Value – what you can get if you trade it
[HAC24]Note the paradox here – for centuries Economists tried to explain what is known as the Diamond-Water paradox. Why does something useful and necessary like water have little value compared to something rare and generally “useless” like a diamond? You can find explanations that relate to the other theories we discussed tonight at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diamond_water_paradox
[HAC25]Like Marx = labor defines value, and we must depend on others to determine how much wealth and value we have
[HAC26]The opportunity cost – value based on what a person will give up for an item, and how much benefit owning the item will afford